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Pareto optimal matchings of students to
courses in the presence of prerequisites
Katar´ına Cechla´rova´, Bettina Klaus, and David F. Manlove
Abstract
We consider the problem of allocating applicants to courses, where each applicant
has a subset of acceptable courses that she ranks in strict order of preference. Each
applicant and course has a capacity, indicating the maximum number of courses and
applicants they can be assigned to, respectively. We thus essentially have a many-to-
many bipartite matching problem with one-sided preferences, which has applications
to the assignment of students to optional courses at a university.
We consider additive preferences and lexicographic preferences as two means of ex-
tending preferences over individual courses to preferences over bundles of courses.
We additionally focus on the case that courses have prerequisite constraints: we will
mainly treat these constraints as compulsory, but we also allow alternative prereq-
uisites. We further study the case where courses may be corequisites.
For these extensions to the basic problem, we present the following algorithmic re-
sults, which are mainly concerned with the computation of Pareto optimal matchings
(POMs). Firstly, we consider compulsory prerequisites. For additive preferences, we
show that the problem of finding a POM is NP-hard. On the other hand, in the
case of lexicographic preferences we give a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a
POM, based on the well-known sequential mechanism. However we show that the
problem of deciding whether a given matching is Pareto optimal is co-NP-complete.
We further prove that finding a maximum cardinality (Pareto optimal) matching is
NP-hard. Under alternative prerequisites, we show that finding a POM is NP-hard
for either additive or lexicographic preferences. Finally we consider corequisites. We
prove that, as in the case of compulsory prerequisites, finding a POM is NP-hard
for additive preferences, though solvable in polynomial time for lexicographic pref-
erences. In the latter case, the problem of finding a maximum cardinality POM is
NP-hard and very difficult to approximate.
1 Introduction
Problems involving the allocation of indivisible goods to agents have gained a lot of attention
in literature, since they model many real scenarios, including the allocation of pupils to
study places [4], workers to positions [22], researchers to projects [29], tenants to houses [1]
and students to courses [10], etc. We assume that agents on one side of the market (pupils,
workers, researchers, tenants, students) have preferences over objects on the other side of the
market (study places, positions, projects, courses, etc.) but not vice versa. In such a setting
where the desires of agents are in general conflicting, economists regard Pareto optimality
(or Pareto efficiency) as a basic, fundamental criterion to be satisfied by an allocation. This
concept guarantees that no agent can be made better off without another agent becoming
worse off. A popular and very intuitive approach to finding Pareto optimal matchings is
represented by the class of sequential allocation mechanisms [24, 9, 8, 3].
In the one-to-one case (each agent receives at most one object, and each object can be
assigned to at most one agent) this mechanism has been given several different names in
the literature, including serial dictatorship [1, 28], queue allocation [34], Greedy-POM [2],
sequential mechanism [8, 3] etc. Several authors independently proved that a matching is
Pareto optimal if and only if can be obtained by the serial dictatorship mechanism (Svensson
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in 1994 [34], Abdulkadirogˇlu and So¨nmez in 1998 [1], Abraham et al. in 2004 [2], and Brams
and King in 2005 [9]).
In general many-to-many matching problems (agents can receive more than one object,
and objects can be assigned to more than one agent), the sequential allocation mechanism
works as follows: a central authority decides on an ordering of agents (often called a policy)
that can contain multiple copies of an agent (up to her capacity). According to the chosen
policy, an agent who has her turn chooses her most preferred object among those that still
have a free slot. This approach was used in [3, 8], where the properties of the obtained
allocation with respect to the chosen policy and strategic issues are studied.
The serial dictatorship mechanism is a special case of the sequential allocation mechanism
where the policy contains each agent exactly once, and when agent a is dealt with, she
chooses her entire most-preferred bundle of objects. The difficulty with serial dictatorship
is that it can output a matching that is highly unfair. For example, it is easy to see that
if there are two agents a1 and a2, each with the same preference list over objects, and each
with the same capacity, which is equal to the length of their preference list, and each object
has capacity 1, the mechanism will give all acceptable objects to ai and no objects to a3−i
when the policy indicates that ai should choose first (i ∈ {1, 2}).
In this paper we shall concentrate on one real-life application of this allocation problem
that arises in education, and so our terminology will involve applicants (students) for the
agents and courses for the objects. In most universities students have some freedom in
their choice of courses, but at the same time they are bound by the rules of the particular
university. A detailed description of the rules of the allocation process and the analysis of
the behaviour of students at Harvard Business School, based on real data, is provided by
Budish and Cantillon [10]. They assume that students have a linear ordering of individual
courses and their preferences over bundles of courses are responsive to these orderings. The
emphasis in [10] was on strategic questions. The empirical results confirmed the theoretical
findings that, loosely speaking, dictatorships (where students choose one at a time their
entire most preferred available bundle) are the only mechanisms that are strategy-proof and
ex-post Pareto efficient.
Another field experiment in course allocation is described by Diebold et al. [14]. The
authors compared the properties of allocations obtained by the sequential allocation mech-
anism where the policy is determined by the arrival time of students (i.e., first-come first-
served) and by two modifications of the Gale-Shapley student-optimal mechanism, i.e., they
assumed that courses may also have preferences or priorities over students. Moreover, they
only considered the case when each student can be assigned to at most one course.
In reality, a student can attend more courses, but not all possible bundles are feasible for
her. Cechla´rova´ et al. [12] considered explicit notions of feasibility for bundles of courses.
For these feasibility concepts, a given bundle can be checked for feasibility for a given
applicant in time polynomial in the number of courses. Such an algorithm may check for
example if no two courses in the bundle are scheduled at the same time, or if the student has
enough budget to pay the fees for all the courses in the bundle, etc. Cechla´rova´ et al. [12]
showed that a sufficient condition for a general sequential allocation mechanism to output
a Pareto optimal matching is that feasible bundles of courses form families that are closed
with respect to subsets, and preferences of students over bundles are lexicographic. They
also showed that under these assumptions a converse result holds, i.e., each Pareto optimal
matching can be obtained by the sequential allocation mechanism for a suitable policy.
Prerequisites and corequisites
In this paper we deal with prerequisite and corequisite constraints. Prerequisite constraints
model the situation where a student may be allowed to subscribe to a course c only if she
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subscribes to a set C ′ of other course(s). The courses in C ′ are usually called prerequisite
courses, or prerequisites, for c. For example, at a School of Mathematics, an Optimal Control
Theory course may have as its prerequisites a course on Differential Equations as well as
a course in Linear Algebra; a prerequisite for a Differential Equations course could be a
Calculus course, etc. On the other hand corequisite constraints model the situation where
a student takes course c1 if and only if she takes course c2. These courses are referred to
as corequisite courses, or corequisites. For example, a corequisite constraint may act on
two courses: one that is a theoretical programming course and the other that is a series of
corresponding programming lab sessions.
We consider three different models involving prerequisite and corequisite constraints.
The first model involves compulsory prerequisites, but we allow the possibility that different
students may have different prerequisite constraints. For example, for a doctoral study
program in Economics, an economics graduate may have as a prerequisite a mathematical
course and, on the other hand, a mathematics graduate may have as a prerequisite a course
on microeconomics, etc. The second model concerns alternative prerequisites. Here it is
assumed that certain courses require that a student subscribes to at least one of a set of
other courses. For example, a course in mathematical modelling may require that a student
attends one of a range of courses that deal with a specific mathematical modelling software
package, such as Maple, MATLAB or Mathematica. Finally, the third model considers
corequisites. Here we assume that constraints on corequisite courses are identical for all
applicants.
As we assume that applicants express their preferences only over individual courses, a
suitable extension of these preferences to preferences over bundles of courses has to be chosen.
Among the most popular extensions are responsive preferences [31]. That is, an applicant
has responsive preferences over bundles of courses if bundle C ′ is preferred to bundle C ′′
whenever C ′ is obtained from C ′′ by replacing some course in C ′′ by a more preferred
course not contained in C ′′. Responsiveness is a very mild requirement and responsive
preferences form a very wide and variable class. Therefore we shall restrict our attention
to two specific examples, namely additive [5, 8, 10] and lexicographic [16, 5, 33, 32, 35]
preferences. Although lexicographic preferences can be modelled as additive preferences by
choosing appropriate weights [8], we would like to avoid this approach as it requires very
large numbers, moreover, assuming lexicographic preferences from the outset leads to more
straightforward algorithms.
To the best of our knowledge, matchings with prerequisite constraints have not been
studied yet from an algorithmic perspective. Some connections can be found in the literature
on scheduling with precedence constraints [26], but, unlike in the scheduling domain, there
is no common optimality criterion for all the agents, since their desires are often conflicting
and all have to be taken into account.
We would however like to draw the reader’s attention to the works of Guerin et al.
[19] and Dodson et al. [15], who analyze a version of a course selection problem in greater
depth, using also probabilistic methods. Their work is a part of a larger research programme
that involves advising college students about what courses to study and when, taking into
account not only the required course prerequisites, but also the students’ course histories
and obtained grades. Based on this information, the authors try to estimate a student’s
ability to take multiple courses concurrently, with the goal to optimise the student’s total
expected utility and her chances of moving successfully toward graduation. Guerin et al.
and Dodson et al. consider also temporal factors, meaning that a student can only take a
certain course in the current semester if she has completed the necessary prerequisites during
previous semesters. By contrast, here we assume that students choose all their courses as
well as their necessary prerequisites simultaneously, and we concentrate on computational
problems connected with producing a matching that fulfils a global welfare criterion.
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Our contribution
As mentioned above, we will formally introduce three possible models of course allocation
involving prerequisites or corequisites. In the first case the prerequisites are antisymmetric
and compulsory (i.e., a constraint might ensure that an applicant can subscribe to course
c1 only if she also subscribes to course c2, but she can attend c2 without attending c1).
For additive preferences we show that computing a Pareto optimal matching is an NP-hard
problem. In the case of lexicographic preferences we illustrate that the simple sequential al-
location mechanism and its natural modification may output a matching that either violates
prerequisites or Pareto optimality. Therefore we stipulate that on her turn, an applicant
chooses her most preferred course together with all the necessary prerequisites. Still, it is
impossible to obtain each possible Pareto optimal matching in this way. It is also unlikely
that an efficient algorithm will be able to produce all Pareto optimal matchings, since the
problem of checking whether a given matching admits a Pareto improvement is NP-complete.
Considering structural properties of Pareto optimal matchings, it is known that finding a
Pareto optimal matching with minimum cardinality is NP-hard, even in the very restricted
one-to-one model (naturally without prerequisites) [2], but here we show that the problem
of finding such a matching with maximum cardinality is also NP-hard.
The second model involving alternative prerequisites (i.e., where a constraint takes the
form that an applicant can attend course c1 only if she also attends either course c2 or
course c3) seems to be computationally the most challenging case. We show that although
a Pareto optimal matching always exists, it cannot be computed efficiently unless P=NP,
both under additive as well as lexicographic preferences of applicants.
For the third case with corequisites (i.e., an applicant can attend a course if and only if
she attends all its corequisites) we propose another modification of the sequential allocation
mechanism for finding Pareto optimal matchings. If the corequisites for all the applicants are
the same, the model is closely related to matchings with sizes [6] or many-to-many matchings
with price-budget constraints [12], and we strengthen the existing results by showing that
the problem of finding a maximum size Pareto optimal matching is not approximable within
N1−ε, for any ε > 0, unless P=NP, where N is the total capacity of the applicants.
The organisation of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we give formal definitions of
the problem models and define relevant notation and terminology. Sections 3, 4 and 5 deal
separately with the three different models, involving compulsory prerequisites, alternative
prerequisites and corequisites respectively. Finally, Section 6 concludes with some open
problems and possible directions for future research. All proofs and examples appear in
Appendices A and B respectively.
2 Definitions and notation
2.1 Basic Course Allocation problem
An instance of the Course Allocation problem (ca) involves a set A = {a1, a2, . . . , an1} of
applicants and a set C = {c1, c2, . . . , cn2} of courses. Each course cj ∈ C has a capacity
q(cj) that denotes the maximum number of applicants that can be assigned to cj . Similarly
each applicant ai ∈ A has a capacity q(ai) denoting the maximum number of courses that
she can attend. The vector q denotes applicants’ and courses’ capacities. Moreover ai
has a strict linear order (preference list) P (ai) over a subset of C. We shall represent ai’s
preferences P (ai) as a simple ordered list of courses, from the most preferred to the least
preferred one. With some abuse of notation, we shall say that a course cj is acceptable to
applicant ai if cj ∈ P (ai), otherwise cj is unacceptable to ai. P denotes the n1-tuple of
applicants’ preferences.Thus altogether, the tuple I = (A,C,q,P) constitutes an instance
4
of ca.
An assignment M is a subset of A×C. The set of applicants assigned to a course cj ∈ C
will be denoted by M(cj) = {ai ∈ A : (ai, cj) ∈ M} and similarly, the bundle of courses
assigned to an applicant ai is M(ai) = {cj ∈ C : (ai, cj) ∈ M}. An assignment M is a
matching if, for each ai ∈ A, M(ai) ⊆ P (ai) and |M(ai)| ≤ q(ai), and for each cj ∈ C,
|M(cj)| ≤ q(cj). In the presence of prerequisites and corequisites, additional feasibility
constraints are to be satisfied by a matching, which will be defined below.
An applicant ai ∈ A has additive preferences over bundles of courses if she has a utility
uai(cj) for each course cj ∈ C, and she prefers a bundle of courses C1 ⊆ C to another bundle
C2 ⊆ C if and only if
∑
cj∈C1 uai(cj) >
∑
cj∈C2 uai(cj).
Applicant ai compares bundles of courses lexicographically if, given two different bundles
C1 ⊆ C and C2 ⊆ C she prefers C1 to C2 if and only if her most preferred course in the
symmetric difference C1 ⊕ C2 belongs to C1. Notice that the lexicographic ordering on
bundles of courses generated by a strict preference order P (ai) is also strict.
Applicant ai prefers matching M
′ to matching M if she prefers M ′(ai) to M(ai). We
say that a matching M ′ (Pareto) dominates a matching M if at least one applicant prefers
M ′ to M and no applicant prefers M to M ′.
A Pareto optimal matching (or POM for short), is a matching that is not (Pareto)
dominated by any other matching. As the dominance relation is a partial order over M,
the set of all matchings in I, and M is finite, a POM exists for each instance of ca.
2.2 Compulsory prerequisites
We now define the first extension of ca involving compulsory prerequisites. Suppose that
for each applicant ai ∈ A, there is a partial order →ai on the set of courses C (i.e., →ai
is a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive binary relation) representing the prerequisites
of applicant ai. It is easy to see that this partial order can be fully specified if for each
cj ∈ C its immediate prerequisites for ai are given.We now define the feasibility of a bundle
of courses relative to the constraints on compulsory prerequisites.
Definition 1. A bundle of courses C ′ ⊆ C is feasible for an applicant ai ∈ A if the following
three conditions are fulfilled:
(i) C ′ ⊆ P (ai) ;
(ii) |C ′| ≤ q(ai) ;
(iii) C ′ fulfils ai’s prerequisites, i.e., for each cj , ck ∈ C, if cj ∈ C ′ and cj →ai ck then
ck ∈ C ′.
A subset C ′ of a partially-ordered set C fulfilling condition (iii) is called a down-set (see
[13]). We shall denote by
→ai
cj the inclusion minimal down-set of C (with respect to ai’s
prerequisites) that contains course cj .
For technical reasons, we assume that
→ai
cj ⊆ P (ai) for each ai ∈ A and each cj ∈ P (ai).
If this is not the case then we can easily modify the preference list of applicant ai either by
deleting a course cj if P (ai) does not contain all the courses in
→ai
cj , or we can append the
missing courses to the end of P (ai).
An instance I of the Course Allocation problem with (compulsory) PRequisites (capr)
comprises a tuple I = (A,C,q,P,→), where (A,C,q,P) is an instance of ca and → is the
n1-tuple of prerequisite partial orders →ai for each applicant ai ∈ A. In an instance of
capr, a matching M is as defined in the ca case, together with the additional property
that, for each applicant ai ∈ A, M(ai) is feasible for ai.
In an instance of capr where the prerequisites are the same for all applicants, we may
drop the applicant subscript when referring to the prerequisite partial order →.
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2.3 Alternative prerequisites
The second model is a variant of capr in which prerequisites need not be compulsory but
are in general presented in the form of alternatives. Formally, each applicant ai has a
mapping 7→ai : C → 2C with the following meaning: if cj 7→ai {ci1 , ci2 , . . . , cik}, it must
then hold that if ai wants to attend course cj then she has to attend at least one of the
courses ci1 , ci2 , . . . , cik too. We thus define a bundle of courses C
′ ⊆ C to be feasible for a
given applicant ai ∈ A if Conditions (i) and (ii) in Definition 1 are satisfied, and moreover,
for any course cj ∈ C ′, if cj 7→ai {ci1 , ci2 , . . . , cik}, then cir ∈ C ′ for some r (1 ≤ r ≤ k).
An instance I of the Course Allocation problem with Alternative PRequisites (caapr)
comprises a tuple I = (A,C,q,P, 7→), where (A,C,q,P) is an instance of ca and 7→ is the
n1-tuple of mappings 7→ai for each applicant ai ∈ A. In an instance of caapr, a matching
M is as defined in the ca case, together with the additional property that, for each applicant
ai ∈ A, M(ai) is feasible for ai.
2.4 Corequisites
In the third and final model we assume that constraints on courses are given in the form of
corequisites. We assume that corequisite constraints are not applicant-specific, and hence
there is a single reflexive, symmetric and transitive relation↔ on C such that each applicant
is allowed to subscribe to a course cj ∈ C only if she also subscribes to each ck ∈ C such
that cj ↔ ck. Two courses cj , ck ∈ C with cj ↔ ck are said to be each other’s corequisites.
Relation↔ is an equivalence relation on C and it effectively partitions the set of courses into
equivalence classes C1, C2, . . . , Cr. Hence an applicant can subscribe either to all courses
in one equivalence class or to none.
Formally, we define a bundle of courses C ′ ⊆ C to be feasible for a given applicant
ai ∈ A if Conditions (i) and (ii) in Definition 1 are satisfied, and moreover, for any two
courses cj , ck ∈ C, if cj ↔ ck then cj ∈ C ′ if and only if ck ∈ C ′. An instance I of the
Course Allocation problem with Corequisites (cacr) comprises a tuple I = (A,C,q,P,↔),
where (A,C,q,P) is an instance of ca and ↔ is as defined above. In an instance of cacr,
a matching M is as defined in the ca case, together with the additional property that, for
each applicant ai ∈ A, M(ai) is feasible for ai.
We remark that we do not consider corequisites as a special case of compulsory prereq-
uisites, nor vice versa, for in the definition compulsory prerequisites, we stipulate that the
order relation is antisymmetric, while for corequisites symmetry is required.
3 Compulsory prerequisites
In the presence of compulsory prerequisites, we consider the case of additive preferences in
Section 3.1 and lexicographic preferences in Section 3.2. It turns out that the problem of
finding a POM under additive preferences is NP-hard, as we show in Section 3.1. Thus the
majority of our attention is focused on the case of lexicographic preferences in Section 3.2.
In that section we mainly consider algorithmic questions associated with the problems of
(i) finding a POM, (ii) testing a matching for Pareto optimality, and (iii) finding a POM of
maximum size.
3.1 Additive preferences
Our first result shows that the assumption of additive preferences in capr makes it difficult
to compute a POM.
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Lemma 2. The problem of finding a most-preferred feasible bundle of courses of a given
applicant with additive preferences in capr is NP-hard.
In the case of just one applicant a1, a matching M is a POM if and only if a1 is assigned
in M her most-preferred feasible bundle of courses, otherwise M is dominated by assigning
a1 to this bundle. Hence the above lemma directly implies the following result.
Theorem 3. Given an instance of capr with additive preferences, the problem of finding
a POM is NP-hard.
Given the above negative result, we do not pursue additive preferences any further in
this section, and instead turn our attention to lexicographic preferences.
3.2 Lexicographic preferences
3.2.1 Finding a POM
In this section we explore variants of the sequential allocation mechanism, and show that
one formulation allows us to find a POM in polynomial time. This mechanism, referred to
as SM-CAPR, does however have some drawbacks: it is not truthful (see Section 6) and it
is not able to compute all POMs in general.
In the context of course allocation when there are some dependencies among courses (for
instance the constraints on prerequisites in capr) the standard sequential mechanism might
output an allocation that does not fulfil some constraints on prerequisites. On the other
hand, if we require that an applicant can only choose a course if she is already assigned all its
prerequisites, the output may be a matching that is not Pareto optimal. This is illustrated
by Example 14 in Appendix B.
Therefore we propose a variant of the sequential allocation mechanism, denoted by SM-
CAPR, that can be regarded as being “in between” the serial dictatorship mechanism and
the general sequential allocation mechanism. Suppose a policy σ is fixed; again one applicant
can appear in σ several times, up to her capacity. Applicant ai on her turn identifies her
most-preferred course cj that she has not yet considered, and that she is not already assigned
to. If all courses ck in
→ai
cj satisfy the property that either (i) ck has a free place or (ii) ck is
already assigned to ai, and the number of courses in
→ai
cj not already assigned to ai does not
exceed the remaining capacity of ai, then ai is assigned the bundle
→ai
cj . If it is impossible
to assign bundle
→ai
cj to ai then ai moves to the next course in her preference list until either
she is assigned to some bundle or her preference list is exhausted. This completes a single
turn for ai.
For this approach we need an algorithm that decides whether applicant ai can be assigned→ai
cj . A subsidiary method called Explore, explicitly given in Algorithm 1, takes as input a
course cj where cj /∈ M(ai) and |M(cj)| < q(cj). Here it is assumed that the matching
M and the capr instance I are global variables. We use a set S, maintained as a global
variable, to collect together the courses in
→ai
cj that are not already assigned to ai, assuming
the whole bundle can be assigned to ai. An array of Booleans called ‘visited’ is maintained as
a global variable and used to prevent a course in
→ai
cj being visited more than once if there are
several paths to it from predecessors. A further global variable, a Boolean ‘feasible’, initially
true, remains true if each course in
→ai
cj either has room for ai or is already assigned to
ai, and becomes false otherwise. Explore is a recursive algorithm that performs a modified
depth-first search in the directed graph corresponding to
→ai
cj .
The pseudocode for SM-CAPR is given in Algorithm 2. This algorithm constructs a
POM M in a given capr instance I relative to a given policy σ, with the aid of Explore.
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Algorithm 1 Explore
Require: course cj where cj /∈M(ai) and |M(cj)| < uj (capr instance I, matching M , applicant
ai, set S and Boolean feasible are global variables)
Ensure: if cj and each of its prerequisites either (i) has room for ai or (ii) is already assigned ai
then all courses not already assigned to ai are added to S and feasible is unchanged, otherwise
feasible is set to false
1: S := S ∪ {cj};
2: if cj is not a leaf node in
→ai
cj then
3: for each ck ∈
→ai
cj \{cj} do
4: if ck /∈M(ai) and not visited(ck) then
5: if |M(ck)| < q(ck) then
6: visited(ck) := true;
7: Explore(ck);
8: else
9: feasible := false;
It uses a Boolean ‘isAssigned’ to determine whether an applicant ai has been assigned to
some bundle of courses on her turn yet. When attempting to assign ai to the bundle
→ai
cj , it
initialises the set S and the Boolean ‘feasible’ as described above in the context of Explore.
It also sets the ‘visited’ Booleans for each course in
→ai
cj in preparation for the depth-first
search carried out by Explore. Once Explore returns, we can assign ai to the bundle
→ai
cj
as long as ‘feasible’ is true and ai has room for the courses in
→ai
cj that she is not already
assigned to; if so, ai is assigned to all such courses and ‘isAssigned’ is given the value true.
Notice that serial dictatorship will be obtained as a special case of SM-CAPR if all the
copies of one applicant form a substring (i.e., a contiguous subsequence) of the policy.
To derive the complexity bound of the algorithm, let us first observe that the complexity
of Explore(cj) is O(Dai) when executed relative to applicant ai, where Dai =
∣∣∣→aicj ∣∣∣. This in
turn is O(Rai) where Rai is the number of courses in →ai , which is obviously O(n2) (recall
that |C| = n2). Thus the complexity of SM-CAPR is O(Ln2), where L is the total length of
the applicants’ preference lists.
Theorem 4. Algorithm SM-CAPR produces a POM for a given instance I of capr and for
a given policy σ in I. The complexity of the algorithm is O(Ln2), where L is the total length
of the applicants’ preference lists and n2 is the number of courses.
The complexity of the algorithm can be no better than O(Ln2) in the worst case, as
Example 15 in Appendix B shows. Example 16 in Appendix B indicates that in general,
SM-CAPR is not capable of generating all POMs for a given capr instance. Theorem 3
shows that finding a POM in the presence of additive preferences is NP-hard. Example 17
in Appendix B shows where SM-CAPR can fail to find a POM in this context.
3.2.2 Testing for Pareto optimality
In the previous subsection we gave a polynomial-time algorithm for constructing a POM
in an instance of capr. It is also reasonable to expect that an alternative approach could
involve starting with an arbitrary matching, and for as long as the current matching M
is dominated, replace M by any matching that dominates it. However, the difficulty with
this method is that the problem of determining whether a matching is Pareto optimal is
computationally hard, as we demonstrate by our next result. This hardness result also
shows that there is unlikely to be a “nice” (polynomial-time checkable) characterisation of
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Algorithm 2 SM-CAPR
Require: capr instance I and a policy σ
Ensure: return M , a POM in I
1: M := ∅;
2: for each applicant ai ∈ σ in turn do
3: isAssigned := false;
4: while ai has not exhausted her preference list and not isAssigned do
5: cj := next course in ai’s list;
6: feasible := true;
7: if cj /∈M(ai) and |M(cj)| < q(cj) then
8: S := ∅;
9: for each ck ∈
→ai
cj do
10: visited(ck) := false;
11: visited(cj) := true;
12: Explore(cj);
13: if feasible and |M(ai)|+ |S| ≤ q(ai) then
14: for each ck ∈ S do
15: M := M ∪ {(ai, ck)};
16: isAssigned := true;
17: return M ;
a POM, in contrast to the case where there are no prerequisites [12]. We firstly define the
following problem:
Name: dom capr
Instance: an instance I of capr and a matching M in I
Question: is there a matching M ′ that dominates M in I?
Theorem 5. dom capr is NP-complete even if each course has capacity 1 and has at most
one immediate prerequisite for each applicant.
We remark that the variant of dom capr for additive preferences is also NP-complete
by Theorem 5, since lexicographic preferences can be viewed as a special case of additive
preferences by creating utilities that steeply decrease in line with applicants’ preferences –
see [8] for more details.
3.2.3 Finding large POMs
Example 16 shows that an instance of capr may admit POMs of different cardinalities,
where the cardinality of a POM refers to the number of occupied course slots. It is known
that finding a POM with minimum cardinality is an NP-hard problem even for ha, the House
Allocation problem (i.e., the restriction of ca in which each applicant and each course has
capacity 1) [2, Theorem 2]. However, by contrast to the case for ha [2, Theorem 1] and ca
[12, Theorem 6]), the problem of finding a maximum cardinality POM in the capr context
is NP-hard, as we demonstrate next via two different proofs. Our first proof of this result
shows that hardness holds even if the matching is not required to be Pareto optimal.
We firstly define some problems. Let max capr and max pom capr denote the problems
of finding a maximum cardinality matching and a maximum cardinality POM respectively,
given an instance of capr. Let max capr-d denote the decision version of max capr:
given an instance I of capr and an integer K, decide whether I admits a matching of
cardinality at least K. We obtain max pom capr-d from max pom capr similarly.
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Theorem 6. max capr-d is NP-complete, even if each applicant has capacity 4 and each
course has capacity 1, and the prerequisites are the same for all applicants. Moreover max
pom capr-d is NP-hard for the same restrictions.
In the case when a matching is required to be Pareto optimal, NP-hardness holds for
stronger conditions on prerequisites than those assumed in Theorem 6.
Theorem 7. max pom capr-d is NP-hard, even if each course has at most one prerequisite,
and the prerequisites are the same for all applicants.
Example 18 in Appendix B shows that the difference in cardinalities between POMs may
be arbitrary, and that SM-CAPR is not in general a constant-factor approximation algorithm
for max pom capr.
4 Alternative prerequisites
In this section we turn our attention to caapr, the analogue of capr in which prerequisites
need not be compulsory but may be presented as alternatives. We will show that, in contrast
to the case for capr, finding a POM is NP-hard, under either additive or lexicographic
preferences.
Recall that as capr is a special case of caapr, Lemma 2 implies that finding a most-
preferred bundle of courses under additive preferences is NP-hard. Now we prove the same
result for lexicographic preferences.
Lemma 8. Given an instance I of caapr and an applicant ai in I, the problem of deciding
whether I admits a matching in which ai receives her most-preferred course is NP-complete.
Corollary 9. The problem of finding the most-preferred feasible bundle of courses of a given
applicant with lexicographic preferences in caapr is NP-hard.
As noted in Section 3.1, in the case of just one applicant a1, a matching M is a POM if
and only if a1 is assigned in M her most-preferred feasible bundle of courses. Hence Lemma
2 and Corollary 9 directly imply the following assertion.
Theorem 10. Given an instance of caapr the problem of finding a POM is NP-hard. The
result holds under either additive or lexicographic preferences.
We remark that, since capr is a special case of caapr, Theorem 5 implies that the prob-
lem of deciding whether a given matching M is a POM is co-NP-complete for lexicographic
preferences (and also for additive preferences by the remark following Theorem 5).
5 Corequisites
In this section we focus on cacr, the extension of ca involving corequisite courses. As in
the case of capr, we will show that finding a POM in the presence of additive preferences is
NP-hard. Thus the majority of our attention is concerned with lexicographic preferences. In
this case we show how to modify the sequential mechanism in order to obtain a polynomial-
time algorithm for finding a POM in the cacr case. Moreover we show that in cacr, the
problem of finding a maximum cardinality POM is very difficult to approximate.
We begin with additive preferences. A simple modification of the proof of Lemma 2
(ensuring that, for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), ci ↔ dri for each r (1 ≤ r ≤ wi − 1)) gives the
following analogue of Theorem 3.
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Theorem 11. Given an instance of cacr with additive preferences, the problem of finding
a POM is NP-hard.
In view of Theorem 11, in the remainder of this section we assume that preferences are
lexicographic. In this case we can find a POM efficiently by dealing with the corequisites as
follows. Let I be an instance of cacr, let σ be a policy in I, and assume the notation defined
in Section 2.4. We lose no generality by supposing that each applicant either finds all the
courses in one equivalence class Ck acceptable, or none of them. Replace all the courses in
Ck by a single supercourse ck, whose capacity is equal to the sum of the capacities of the
courses in Ck. For any applicant ai ∈ A who finds all courses in Ck acceptable, remove
all such courses from ai’s list and replace them by c
k; since preferences are lexicographic,
the position of ck in the modified preference list of ai is the position of the most-preferred
course of Ck in her original list. Let I ′ denote the cacr instance obtained from I by using
this transformation.
The sequential mechanism for cacr can be executed on I ′ as follows. The mechanism
works according to a given policy σ in stages. In one stage, the applicant ai who next has
her turn according to σ, chooses her most-preferred supercourse ck to which she has not
yet applied. Applicant ai is assigned to c
k if two conditions are fulfilled: (i) the number of
courses assigned to ai so far plus the cardinality of C
k does not exceed q(ai), and (ii) each
course cj ∈ Ck still has a free slot. If this is not possible, at the same stage ai applies to
her next supercourse until she is either assigned some supercourse or her preference list is
exhausted. Once the whole process terminates, let M ′ be the assignment of applicants to
supercourses in I ′ and construct the following assignment M in I from M ′:
M = {(ai, cj) : ai ∈ A ∧ cj ∈ Ck ∧ (ai, ck) ∈M ′}.
Let SM-CACR denote the mechanism that constructs M from I and σ. With a suitable
choice of data structures this algorithm can be implemented to run in O(L+n2) time, where
L is the total length of the applicants’ preference lists and n2 is the number of courses.
Theorem 12. Algorithm SM-CACR produces a POM for a given instance I of cacr and
for a given policy σ in I. The complexity of the algorithm is O(L+n2), where L is the total
length of the applicants’ preference lists and n2 is the number of courses.
In the cacr model as defined in Section 2.4, corequisite constraints are common to all
applicants. In this setting, and after the modification described prior to Theorem 12, in
which courses are merged into supercourses, cacr becomes equivalent to cap, the extension
of ca with price-budget constraints described in [12]. For an instance I of cap, it is known
that for each POM M in I, there exists a policy σ such that executing SM-CACR relative
to σ produces M [12, Theorem 3]. Example 19 in Appendix B presents an observation
about the behaviour of SM-CACR if we extend it to the variant of cacr in which corequisite
constraints are specific to individual applicants.
Given an instance of cap, the problem of finding a maximum cardinality POM is NP-
hard [12, Theorem 7]. Using the connection between cacr and cap described in the previous
paragraph, the same is therefore true for max pom cacr, the problem of finding a maximum
cardinality POM, given an instance of cacr. We now strengthen this result by showing that
max pom cacr is very difficult to approximate.
Theorem 13. max pom cacr is NP-hard and not approximable within a factor of N1−ε,
for any ε > 0, unless P=NP, where N is the total capacity of the applicants.
6 Open problems and directions for future research
We would like to conclude with several open problems and directions for future research.
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1. Refining the boundary between efficiently solvable and hard problems. In
the proofs of the NP-hardness and inapproximability results in this paper we had
some applicants whose preference lists were not complete and/or whose capacity was
not bounded by a constant. Will the hardness results still be valid if there are no
unacceptable courses and all capacities are bounded? These problems also call for a
more detailed multivariate complexity analysis. It might be interesting to determine
whether restricting some other parameters, e.g., the lengths of preference lists, may
make the problems tractable.
2. Indifferences in the preference lists. In this paper, we assumed that all the
preferences are strict. If preference lists contain ties, sequential mechanisms have to
be carefully modified to ensure Pareto optimality. Polynomial-time algorithms for
finding a Pareto optimal matching in the presence of ties have been given in the
context of hat (the extension of ha where preference lists may include ties) by Krysta
et al. [25] and in its many-to-many generalisation cat (the extension of ca where
preference lists may include ties) by Cechla´rova´ et al. [11]. However as far as we are
aware, it remains open to extend these algorithms to the cases of capr and cacr
where preference lists may include ties.
3. Strategic issues. By a standard argument, one can ensure that the sequential mech-
anism that lets each applicant on her turn choose her entire most-preferred bundle
of courses (i.e., the serial dictatorship mechanism) is strategy-proof even in the case
of prerequisites. However, serial dictatorship may be very unfair, as the first dictator
may grab all the courses and leave nothing for the rest of the applicants. Let us draw
the reader’s attention to several economic papers that highlight the special position of
serial dictatorship among the mechanisms for allocation of multiple indivisible goods:
serial dictatorship is the only allocation rule that is Pareto efficient, strategy-proof
and fulfils some additional properties, namely non-bossiness and citizen sovereignty
[30], and population monotonicity or consistency [23]. We were not able to obtain a
similar characterization of serial dictatorship for capr.
As far as the general sequential mechanism is concerned, a recent result by Hosseini
and Larson [20] shows that no sequential mechanism that allows interleaving policies
(i.e., in which an ai is allowed to pick courses more than once, and between two turns
of ai another applicant has the right to pick a course) is strategy-proof, even in the
simpler case without any prerequisites. It immediately follows that SM-CAPR is not
strategy-proof. However, it is not known whether a successful manipulation can be
computed efficiently. Further, we have shown that in capr, not all POMs can be
obtained by a sequential mechanism. We leave it open as to whether a strategy-proof
and Pareto optimal mechanism other than serial dictatorship exists in capr.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by VEGA grants 1/0344/14 and 1/0142/15 from the Slovak Scien-
tific Grant Agency (Cechla´rova´), by the Swiss National Science Foundation SNFS (Klaus),
by grant EP/K010042/1 from the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council
(Manlove), and by a Short-Term Scientific Mission from COST Action IC1205 on Com-
putational Social Choice (Manlove). Part of this work was carried out whilst the authors
visited Corvinus University of Budapest, and whilst the third author visited P.J. Sˇafa´rik
University. This research was initiated during Dagstuhl Seminar 15241 on Computational
Social Choice: Theory and Applications [7]. We would like to thank the following Dagstuhl
participants who were involved in initial discussions regarding the results in this paper:
Haris Aziz, Pe´ter Biro´, Jiehua Chen and Nicholas Mattei.
12
References
[1] A. Abdulkadirogˇlu and T. So¨nmez. Random serial dictatorship and the core from
random endowments in house allocation problems. Econometrica, 66(3):689–701, 1998.
[2] D.J. Abraham, K. Cechla´rova´, D.F. Manlove, and K. Mehlhorn. Pareto optimality in
house allocation problems. In Proceedings of ISAAC ’04: the 15th Annual International
Symposium on Algorithms and Computation, volume 3341 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 3–15. Springer, 2004.
[3] H. Aziz, T. Walsh, and L. Xia. Possible and necessary allocations via sequential mech-
anisms. In Proceedings of IJCAI 2015: the 24th International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, pages 468–474. AAAI Press, 2015.
[4] M. Balinski and T. So¨nmez. A tale of two mechanisms: student placement. Journal of
Economic Theory, 84(1):73–94, 1999.
[5] S. Barbera`, W. Bossert, and P.K. Pattanaik. Ranking sets of objects. In S. Barbera`,
P.J. Hammond, and C. Seidl, editors, Handbook of Utility Theory, volume 2, chapter 17,
pages 893–977. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004.
[6] P. Biro´ and E. McDermid. Matching with sizes (or scheduling with processing set
restrictions). Discrete Applied Mathematics, 164(1):61–67, 2014.
[7] C. Boutilier, B. Dorn, N. Maudet, and V. Merlin. Computational Social Choice: Theory
and Applications (Dagstuhl Seminar 15241). Dagstuhl Reports, 5(6):1–27, 2016.
[8] S. Bouveret and J. Lang. Elicitation-free protocol for allocating indivisible goods.
In Proceedings of IJCAI 2011: the 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, pages 73–78. AAAI Press, 2011.
[9] S.J. Brams and D.L. King. Efficient fair division: Help the worst off or avoid envy?
Rationality and Society, 17(4):387–421, 2005.
[10] E. Budish and E. Cantillon. The multi-unit assignment problem: Theory and evidence
from course allocation at Harvard. American Economic Review, 102(5):2237–2271,
2012.
[11] K. Cechla´rova´, P. Eirinakis, T. Fleiner, D. Magos, D.F. Manlove, I. Mourtos,
E. Ocel’a´kova´, and B. Rastegari. Pareto optimal matchings in many-to-many mar-
kets with ties. In Proceedings of SAGT 2015: the 8th International Symposium on
Algorithmic Game Theory, pages 27–39. Springer, 2015.
[12] K. Cechla´rova´, P. Eirinakis, T. Fleiner, D. Magos, I. Mourtos, and E. Potpinkova´.
Pareto optimality in many-to-many matching problems. Discrete Optimization, 14:160–
169, 2014.
[13] B.A. Davey and H.A. Priestly. Introduction to lattices and order. Cambridge University
Press, 1990.
[14] F. Diebold, H. Aziz, M. Bichler, F. Matthes, and A. Schneider. Course allocation via
stable matching. Business and Information Systems Engineering, 6(2):97–110, 2014.
[15] T. Dodson, N. Mattei, J.T. Guerin, and J. Goldsmith. An English-language argumenta-
tion interface for explanation generation with Markov decision processes in the domain
of academic advising. ACM Transactions on Interactive Intelligent Systems, 3(3):18,
2013.
13
[16] P.C. Fishburn. Axioms for lexicographic preferences. Review of Economic Studies,
42(3):415–419, 1975.
[17] M.R. Garey and D.S. Johnson. Computers and Intractability. Freeman, San Francisco,
CA., 1979.
[18] M.R. Garey, D.S. Johnson, and L. Stockmeyer. Some simplified NP-complete graph
problems. Theoretical Computer Science, 1:237–267, 1976.
[19] J.T. Guerin, J. Hanna, L. Ferland, N. Mattei, and J. Goldsmith. The academic advising
planning domain. In Proceedings of WS-IPC-12: the 3rd Workshop on the International
Planning Competition, pages 1–5, 2012.
[20] H. Hosseini and K. Larson. Strategyproof quota mechanisms for multiple assignment
problems. Technical Report 1507.07064, Computing Research Repository, Cornell Uni-
versity Library, 2015. Available from http://arxiv.org/abs/1507.07064.
[21] R.M. Karp. Reducibility among combinatorial problems. In R.E. Miller and J.W.
Thatcher, editors, Complexity of Computer Computations, pages 85–103. Plenum Press,
1972.
[22] A.S. Kelso, Jr. and V.P. Crawford. Job matching, coalition formation and gross sub-
stitutes. Econometrica, 50:1483–1504, 1982.
[23] B. Klaus and E. Miyagawa. Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple
assignment problems. International Journal of Game Theory, 30:421–435, 2001.
[24] D.A. Kohler and R. Chandrasekaran. A class of sequential games. Operations Research,
19(2):270–277, 1971.
[25] P. Krysta, D.F. Manlove, B. Rastegari, and J. Zhang. Size versus truthfulness in the
House Allocation problem. In Proceedings of EC 2014: the 15th ACM Conference on
Economics and Computation, pages 453–470. ACM, 2014.
[26] J. K. Lenstra and A.H.G. Rinnooy Kan. Complexity of scheduling under precedence
constraints. Operations Research, 26(1):22–35, 1978.
[27] D. Maier and J.A. Storer. A note on the complexity of the superstring problem. Techni-
cal Report 233, Princeton University, Department of Electrical Engineering and Com-
puter Science, Princeton, NJ, October 1977.
[28] M. Manea. Serial dictatorship and Pareto optimality. Games and Economic Behavior,
61:316–330, 2007.
[29] D. Monte and N. Tumennasan. Matching with quorums. Economics Letters, 120:14–17,
2013.
[30] S. Pa´pai. Strategyproof and nonbossy multiple assignments. Journal of Public Eco-
nomic Theory, 3(3):257–271, 2001.
[31] A.E. Roth. The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem.
Journal of Economic Theory, 36:277–288, 1985.
[32] D. Saban and J. Sethuraman. A note on object allocation under lexicographic prefer-
ences. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 50:283–289, 2014.
14
[33] L.J. Schulman and V.V. Vazirani. Allocation of divisible goods under lexicographic
preferences. Technical Report 1206.4366, Computing Research Repository, Cornell
University Library, 2012. Available from http://arxiv.org/abs/1206.4366.
[34] L.-G. Svensson. Queue allocation of indivisible goods. Social Choice and Welfare,
11(4):323–330, 1994.
[35] T. Todo, H. Sun, and M. Yokoo. Strategyproof exchange with multiple private en-
dowments. In Proceedings of AAAI 2014: the 28th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, pages 805–811, 2014.
A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2. We transform from the knapsack problem, which is defined as follows.
An instance I of knapsack comprises a set of integers w1, w2, . . . , wn, p1, p2, . . . , pn, W,P .
The problem is to decide whether there exists a set K ⊆ {1, 2 . . . , n} such that∑i∈K wi ≤W
and
∑
i∈K pi ≥ P . knapsack is NP-complete [21].
Let us construct an instance J of capr as follows. There is a single applicant a1
such that q(a1) = W . The set of courses is C ∪ D, where C = {c1, c2, . . . , cn} and
D = ∪ni=1{d1i , d2i , . . . , dwi−1i }. For each course ci (1 ≤ i ≤ n), its utility for applicant a1 is
equal to pi. Moreover ci has wi − 1 prerequisites d1i , d2i , . . . , dwi−1i . For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
and j (1 ≤ j ≤ wi − 1), dji has utility εji for a1, where the ε values are all positive, distinct
and add up to less than 1. They are selected simply to ensure that a1’s preferences over
individual courses are strict. It is easy to see that in J , a1 has a feasible bundle with utility
at least P if and only if I is a yes-instance of knapsack.
Proof of Theorem 4. It is straightforward to verify that the assignment M produced by SM-
CAPR is a matching in I. Suppose for a contradiction that M is not a POM. Then there
exists a matching M ′ that dominates M . Let A′ be the set of applicants who prefer their
assignment in M ′ to their assignment in M . For each aj ∈ A′, denote by sj the first stage
of SM-CAPR when aj did not get a course, say cij , that is assigned to her in M
′. Stage sj
must have initiated a call to Explore(cij ) with applicant aj , for cij cannot be a prerequisite
for any course assigned to aj before stage sj . Clearly cij was not assigned to aj in M , and
cij is the most-preferred course in M
′(aj)\M(aj). Let ak = arg minaj∈A′{sj}.
As cik ∈ M ′(ak), all the prerequisites of cik also belong to M ′(ak). Since sk is the first
stage in which an applicant received a course in M ′ but not in M , all the courses assigned in
M to any applicant aj in previous stages also belong to M
′(aj), for otherwise M ′ does not
dominate M . Thus it was not the case that applicant ak failed to receive course cik in M at
stage sk because ak did not have room for cik and all of its prerequisites not already assigned
to her in M . Rather, applicant ak failed to receive course cik in M at stage sk because at
least one of the prerequisite courses of cik , say cr, was already full in M before stage sk. It
follows from our previous remark that in M ′, all the places in cr are occupied by applicants
other than ak. Thus cik cannot be assigned to ak in M
′ after all, a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 5. Clearly dom capr is in NP. To show NP-hardness, we reduce from
exact 3-cover, which is NP-complete [21].
Name: exact 3-cover
Instance: a set X = {x1, x2, . . . , x3n} and a set T = {T1, T2, . . . , Tm} such that for
each i (1 ≤ i ≤ m), Ti ⊆ X and |Ti| = 3.
Question: is there a subset T ′ of T such that Ti ∩ Tj = ∅ for each Ti, Tj ∈ T ′ and
∪Ti∈T ′Ti = X?
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Let I be an instance of exact 3-cover as defined above. For each Ti ∈ T , let us denote
the elements that belong to Ti by xi1 , xi2 , xi3 . Obviously, we lose no generality by assuming
that m ≥ n.
We construct an instance J of dom capr based on I in the following way. The set
of applicants is A = {a1, a2, . . . , am+1}. The capacities are q(ai) = 4 (1 ≤ i ≤ m) and
q(am+1) = 2n+m. The set of courses is C = T ∪X∪Y ∪W , where T = {T1, T2, . . . , Tm}, X =
{x1, x2, . . . , x3n}, Y = {y1, y2, . . . , ym} and W = {w1, w2, . . . , wm−n}. (Some of the courses
in J derived from the elements and sets in I are denoted by identical symbols, but no
ambiguity should arise.) The preferences of the applicants are:
P (ai) : Ti, [W ], yi, xi1 , xi2 , xi3 (1 ≤ i ≤ m)
P (am+1) : y1, [X], [W ], y2, . . . , ym
where the symbols [W ] and [X] denote all the courses in W and X, respectively, in an
arbitrary strict order. Recall that {xi1 , xi2 , xi3} ⊆ X (1 ≤ i ≤ m). The prerequisites of
applicants are:
ai : Ti →ai xi1 →ai xi2 →ai xi3 (1 ≤ i ≤ m)
am+1 : y1 →am+1 y2 →am+1 · · · →am+1 ym
Define the following matching:
M = {(ai, yi) : 1 ≤ i ≤ m} ∪ {(am+1, xj) : 1 ≤ j ≤ 3n)} ∪ {(am+1, wk) : 1 ≤ k ≤ m− n)}.
We claim that I admits an exact cover if and only if M is dominated in J .
For, suppose that {Tj1 , Tj2 , . . . , Tjn} is an exact cover in I. We construct a matching
M ′ in J as follows. For each k (1 ≤ k ≤ n), in M ′, assign ajk to Tjk and to ajk ’s three
prerequisites of Tjk that belong to X. Let A
′ = {aj1 , aj2 , . . . , ajn , am+1} and let A\A′ =
{ak1 , ak2 , . . . , akm−n}. For each r (1 ≤ r ≤ m− n), in M ′, assign akr to wr. Finally in M ′,
assign am+1 to every course in Y . It is straightforward to verify that M
′ dominates M in
J .
Conversely, suppose there exists a matching M ′ that dominates M in J . Then at least
one applicant must be better off in M ′ compared to M .
If am+1 improves, she must obtain y1 and so, due to her prerequisites, all the courses in
Y . This means that each applicant ai (1 ≤ i ≤ m) must obtain a course that she prefers to
yi.
Each such applicant ai can improve relative to M in two ways. Either she obtains in M
′
a course in W , or she obtains Ti. In the latter case then she must receive the corresponding
courses xi1 , xi2 , xi3 in M
′. In either of these two cases, since am+1 cannot be worse off, she
must obtain in M ′ the course y1 and hence all courses in Y .
This means that in M ′ all the applicants must strictly improve compared to M . As
there are only n −m courses in W , there are exactly n applicant in A\{am+1} – let these
applicants be {aj1 , aj2 , . . . , ajn} – who obtain a course in T and its three prerequisites in
X. As the capacity of each course is 1, it follows that {Tjk : 1 ≤ j ≤ n} is an exact cover in
I.
Proof of Theorem 6. Clearly max capr-d is in NP. To show NP-hardness, we reduce from
ind set-d in cubic graphs; here ind set-d is the decision version of ind set, the problem
of finding a maximum independent set in a given graph. ind set-d is NP-complete in
cubic graphs [18, 27]. Let 〈G,K〉 be an instance of ind set-d in cubic graphs, where
G = (V,E) is a cubic graph and K is a positive integer. Assume that V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}
and E = {e1, e2, . . . , em}. For a given vertex vi ∈ V , let Ei ⊆ E denote the set of edges
incident to vi in G. Clearly |Ei| = 3 as G is cubic.
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We form an instance I of max capr-d as follows. Let A be the set of applicants and
let V ∪ E be the set of courses, where A = {ai : vi ∈ V } (we use the same notation for the
vertices and edges in G as we do for the courses in I, but no ambiguity should arise.) Let
the capacity of each applicant be 4 and the capacity of each course be 1. The preference
list of each applicant is as follows:
ai : vi [Ei] (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
where the symbol [Ei] denotes all members of Ei listed in arbitrary order. For each vi ∈ V
and for each ej ∈ Ei, define the prerequisite vi → ej for all applicants. We claim that G has
an independent set of size at least K if and only if I has a matching of size at least m+K.
For, suppose that S is an independent set in G where |S| ≥ K. Let A′ = {ai ∈ A :
vi ∈ S}. We form an assignment M in I as follows. For each applicant ai ∈ A′, assign ai
to vi plus the prerequisite courses in Ei. Then for each applicant ai /∈ A′, assign ai to any
remaining courses in Ei (if any). It is straightforward to verify that M is a matching in I.
Also |M | = m+ |S| ≥ m+K, since every applicant ai ∈ A′ obtains vi and all prerequisite
courses in Ei, and then the applicants in A\A′ are collectively assigned to all remaining
unmatched courses in E.
Conversely suppose that M is a matching in I such that |M | ≥ m + K. Let S denote
the courses in V that are matched in M , and suppose that |S| < K. Then since |E| = m
and all courses have capacity 1, M ≤ |S|+ |E| ≤ m+ |S| < m+K, a contradiction. Hence
|S| ≥ K. We now claim that S is an independent set in G. For, suppose that vi and vj are
two adjacent vertices in G that are both in S. Then it is impossible for both ai and aj to
meet their prerequisites on vi and vj in I, respectively, a contradiction.
To show the NP-hardness of max pom capr-d, we make the observation that in the
above proof of NP-completeness of max capr-d, the matching M in I constructed from an
independent set S in G is in fact Pareto optimal. To see this, let σ be an ordering of the
applicants such that every applicant in A′ precedes every applicant in A\A′. Let M be the
result of running Algorithm SM-CAPR relative to the ordering σ. It follows by Theorem 4
that M is a POM in I. The remainder of the proof of NP-completeness of max capr-d can
then be used to show that max pom capr-d is NP-hard.
Proof of Theorem 7. We firstly remark that, in view of Theorem 5, it is not known whether
max pom capr-d belongs to NP. We show NP-hardness for this problem via a reduction
from (2,2)-e3-sat, which is defined as follows:
Name: (2,2)-e3-sat
Instance: a Boolean formula B, where each clause in B has size three, and each
variable occurs exactly twice as an unnegated literal and exactly twice as a negated
literal in B.
Question: is B satisfiable?
Let B be an instance of (2,2)-e3-sat, where V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} is the set of variables
and C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm} is the set of clauses. We construct an instance I of max pom
capr-d as follows. Let X ∪ Y be the set of courses, where X = {x1i , x2i , x¯1i , x¯2i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}
and Y = {y1i , y2i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. The courses in X correspond to the first and second
occurrences of vi and v¯i in B for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Let A ∪ G be the set of applicants,
where A = {aj : 1 ≤ j ≤ m} and G = {g1i , g2i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. Each course has capacity 1.
Each applicant in A has capacity 1, whilst each applicant in G has capacity 2. For each i
(1 ≤ i ≤ n), define the prerequisite y1i → y2i , which is the same for all applicants. For each
j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) and for each s (1 ≤ s ≤ 3), let x(csj) denote the X-course corresponding to
the literal appearing at position s of clause cj in B. For example if the second position of
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clause c5 contains the second occurrence of literal v¯i, then x(c
2
5) = x¯
2
i . The preference lists
of the applicants are as follows:
P (aj) : x(c
1
j ), x(c
2
j ), x(c
3
j ) (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
P (g1i ) : y
1
i , y
2
i , x
1
i , x
2
i (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
P (g2i ) : y
1
i , y
2
i , x¯
1
i , x¯
2
i (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
We claim that B has a satisfying truth assignment if and only if I has a POM of size m+4n.
For, suppose that f is a satisfying truth assignment for B. We form a matching M in
I as follows. For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), if f(vi)=true then add the pairs (g1i , y1i ), (g1i , y2i ),
(g2i , x¯
1
i ), (g
2
i , x¯
2
i ) to M . On the other hand if f(vi)=false then add the pairs (g
1
i , x
1
i ),
(g1i , x
2
i ), (g
2
i , y
1
i ), (g
2
i , y
2
i ) to M . For each j (1 ≤ j ≤ m), at least one literal in cj is true
under f . Let s be the minimum integer such that the literal at position s of cj is true under
f . Course x(csj) is still unmatched by construction; add (aj , x(c
s
j)) to M . It may be verified
that M is a POM of size m+ 4n in I.
Conversely suppose that M is a POM in I of size m + 4n. Then the cardinality of M
implies that every applicant is full in M . We firstly show that, for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n),
either {(g1i , y1i ), (g1i , y2i )} ⊆ M or {(g2i , y1i ), (g2i , y2i )} ⊆ M . Suppose this is not the case. As
a consequence of the prerequisites, if (gri , y
1
i ) ∈ M for some i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and r ∈ {1, 2},
then (gri , y
2
i ) ∈ M . Suppose now that (gri , y2i ) ∈ M for some r ∈ {1, 2}, but (gri , y1i ) /∈ M .
Let M ′ be the matching obtained from M by removing any assignee of gri worse than y
2
i (if
such an assignee exists) and adding (gri , y
1
i ) to M . Then M
′ dominates M , a contradiction.
Now suppose that y2i is unmatched in M . Let M
′ be the matching obtained from M by
removing any assignee of g1i worse than y
2
i (if such an assignee exists) and adding (g
1
i , y
r
i )
to M (r ∈ {1, 2}). Then M ′ dominates M , a contradiction. Thus the claim is established.
It follows that for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), either g1i is matched in M to two members of X and
g2i is matched in M to two members of Y , or vice versa.
Now create a truth assignment f in B as follows. For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), if (g1i , y1i ) ∈M ,
set f(vi)=true, otherwise set f(vi)=false. We claim that f is a satisfying truth assignment
for B. For, let j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) be given. Then (aj , x(csj)) ∈ M for some s (1 ≤ s ≤ 3).
If x(csj) = x
r
i for some i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and r (r ∈ {1, 2}) then f(vi) = T by construction.
Similarly if x(csj) = x¯
r
i for some (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and r (r ∈ {1, 2}) then f(vi) = F by
construction. Hence f satisfies B.
Proof of Lemma 8. Clearly the problem belongs to NP. To show NP-hardness, we reduce
from vc-d, the decision version of vc, which is the problem of finding a vertex cover of
minimum size in a given graph. vc-d is NP-complete [17]. Let 〈G,K〉 be an instance of vc-
d, where G = (V,E) is a graph and K is a positive integer. Assume that V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}
and E = {e1, e2, . . . , em}. We construct an instance I of caapr as follows. Let the set of
courses be V ∪ E ∪ {b} (again, we use the same notation for vertices and edges in G as
we do for courses in I, but no ambiguity should arise.) There is a single applicant a1 with
capacity m+K + 1 whose preference list is as follows:
P (a1) : b, e1, e2, . . . , em, v1, v2, . . . , vn.
Course b has a single compulsory prerequisite course e1, and each course ej (2 ≤ j ≤
m− 1) has a single compulsory prerequisite course ej+1. Moreover, all the E-courses have
(alternative) prerequisites; namely, for any j (1 ≤ j ≤ m), if course ej corresponds to the
edge ej = {vi, vk} then ej 7→a1 {vi, vk}. We claim that G admits a vertex cover of size at
most K if and only if I admits a matching in which a1 is assigned course b.
For, suppose that G admits a vertex cover S where |S| ≤ K. Form a matching M by
assigning a1 to the bundle B = {b} ∪ E ∪ S. Then B is a feasible bundle of courses for a1,
and b ∈ B.
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Conversely, suppose I admits a matching M in which a1 is assigned a bundle containing
course b. Then, due to the prerequisites, B must contain all E-courses and for each course
in ej ∈ E, B must contain some course in vi ∈ V that corresponds to a vertex incident to
ej . Let S = B ∩ V . Clearly S is a vertex cover in G, and as q(a) = m + K + 1, it follows
that |S| ≤ K.
Proof of Theorem 12. It is straightforward to verify that the assignment M produced by
SM-CACR is a matching in I. Suppose for a contradiction that M is not a POM in I.
Denote by M ′ the matching in I ′ that SM-CACR constructs. Then there exists a matching
M ′′ that dominates M ′ in I ′. Let A′ be the set of applicants who prefer, in I ′, their
assignment in M ′′ to their assignment in M ′. For each aj ∈ A′, denote by sj the first
stage of SM-CACR when aj did not get a supercourse, say c
ij , that is assigned to her in
M ′′. Clearly cij was not assigned to aj in M ′, and cij is the most-preferred supercourse in
M ′′(aj)\M ′(aj). Let ak = arg minaj∈A′{sj}.
Clearly cik ∈M ′′(ak). Moreover since sk is the first stage in which an applicant received
a supercourse in M ′′ but not in M ′, all the supercourses assigned in M ′ to any applicant aj
in previous stages also belong to M ′′(aj), for otherwise M ′′ does not dominate M ′. Thus
it was not the case that applicant ak failed to receive supercourse c
ik in M ′ at stage sk
because ak did not have room for c
ik in M ′. Rather, applicant ak failed to receive course
cik in M ′ at stage sk because at least one of the courses in Cik , say cr, was already full in
M ′ before stage sk. It follows from our previous remark that in M ′′, all the places in cr are
occupied by applicants other than ak. Thus c
ik cannot be assigned to ak in M
′′ after all, a
contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 13. Let ε > 0 be given. Let B be an instance of (2,2)-e3-sat (see
the proof of Theorem 7), where V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} is the set of variables and C =
{c1, c2, . . . , cm} is the set of clauses. Let β =
⌈
2
ε
⌉
and let α = nβ .
We form an instance I of cacr as follows. Let X ∪ Y ∪ Z be the set of courses, where
X = {x1i , x2i , x¯1i , x¯2i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, Y = {y1i , y2i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} and Z = {z1, z2, . . . , zD}, where
D = 6n(α − 1) + 1. The courses in X correspond to the first and second occurrences of
vi and v¯i in B for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Let A ∪ G ∪ {b, h} be the set of applicants, where
A = {aj : 1 ≤ j ≤ m} and G = {g1i , g2i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. Each course has capacity 1. Each
applicant in A has capacity 1, each applicant in G has capacity 2, h has capacity 2n −m
and b has capacity D.
For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), courses y1i and y2i are corequisites. Also all the courses in Z are
corequisites. For each j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) and for each s (1 ≤ s ≤ 3), x(csj) is as defined in the
proof of Theorem 7. The preference lists of the applicants are as follows:
P (aj) : x(c
1
j ), x(c
2
j ), x(c
3
j ) (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
P (g1i ) : y
1
i , y
2
i , x
1
i , x
2
i (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
P (g2i ) : y
1
i , y
2
i , x¯
1
i , x¯
2
i (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
P (h) : [X]
P (b) : [X], [Z]
In the preference lists of h and b, the symbols [X] and [Z] denote all members of X and
Z listed in arbitrary strict order, respectively. In I the total capacity of the applicants,
denoted by N , satisfies N = D + 6n. We claim that if B has a satisfying truth assignment
then I has a POM of size D + 6n, whilst if B does not have a satisfying truth assignment
then any POM in I has size at most 6n.
For, suppose that f is a satisfying truth assignment for B. We form a matching M in
I as follows. For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), if f(vi)=true then add the pairs (g1i , y1i ), (g1i , y2i ),
(g2i , x¯
1
i ), (g
2
i , x¯
2
i ) to M . On the other hand if f(vi)=false then add the pairs (g
1
i , x
1
i ),
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(g1i , x
2
i ), (g
2
i , y
1
i ), (g
2
i , y
2
i ) to M . For each j (1 ≤ j ≤ m), at least one literal in cj is true
under f . Let s be the minimum integer such that the literal at position s of cj is true under
f . Course x(csj) is still unmatched by construction; add (aj , x(c
s
j)) to M . There remain
2n−m courses in X that are as yet unmatched in M ; assign all these courses to h. Finally
assign all courses in Z to b in M . It may be verified that M is a POM of size D + 6n in I.
Now suppose that f admits no satisfying truth assignment. Let M be any POM in I.
We will show that |M | ≤ 6n. Suppose not. Then |M | > 6n and the only way this is possible
is if at least one course in Z is matched in M . But only b can be assigned members of Z in
M , and since all pairs of courses in Z are corequisites, it follows that M(b) = Z.
We next show that, for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), either {(g1i , y1i ), (g1i , y2i )} ⊆ M or {(g2i , y1i ),
(g2i , y
2
i )} ⊆ M . Suppose this is not the case for some i (1 ≤ i ≤ n). As a consequence of
the corequisite restrictions on courses in Y , y1i and y
2
i are unmatched in M . Let M
′ be the
matching obtained from M by deleting any assignee of g1i worse than y
2
i (if such an assignee
exists) and by adding (g1i , y
1
i ) and (g
1
i , y
2
i ) to M . Then M
′ dominates M , a contradiction.
We claim that each course in X is matched in M . For, suppose that some course x ∈ X
is unmatched. Then let M ′ be the matching obtained from M by unassigning b from all
courses in Z, and by assigning b to x. Then M ′ dominates M , a contradiction.
It follows that every course in X ∪ Y is matched in M . Since |X ∪ Y | = 6n and the
applicants in A ∪G ∪ {h} have total capacity 6n, every applicant in A ∪G ∪ {h} is full.
Create a truth assignment f in B as follows. For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), if (g1i , y1i ) ∈M , set
f(vi)=true, otherwise set f(vi)=false. We claim that f is a satisfying truth assignment
for B. For, let j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) be given. Then (aj , x(csj)) ∈ M for some s (1 ≤ s ≤ 3).
If x(csj) = x
r
i for some i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and r (r ∈ {1, 2}) then f(vi)=true by construction.
Similarly if x(csj) = x¯
r
i for some (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and r (r ∈ {1, 2}) then f(vi)=false by
construction. Hence f satisfies B, a contradiction.
Thus if B is satisfiable then I admits a POM of size D+ 6n = 6n(α−1) + 1 + 6n > 6nα.
If B is not satisfiable then any POM in I has size at most 6n. Hence an α-approximation
algorithm for max pom cacr implies a polynomial-time algorithm to determine whether
B is satisfiable, a contradiction to the NP-completeness of (2,2)-e3-sat.
It remains to show that N1−ε ≤ α. On the one hand, N = 6n+D = 6nα+ 1 ≤ 7nα =
7nβ+1. Hence nβ ≥ N ββ+1 7− ββ+1 . On the other hand, N = 6nα + 1 ≥ α = nβ ≥ 7β as we
may assume, without loss of generality, that n ≥ 7. It follows that 7− ββ+1 ≥ N− 1β+1 . Thus
α = nβ ≥ N ββ+1 7− ββ+1 ≥ N ββ+1N− 1β+1 = N β−1β+1 = N1− 2β+1 ≥ N1−ε.
B Appendix: Examples
Example 14. Construct a capr instance in which A = {a1, a2} and C = {c1, c2, c3, c4}.
Each applicant has capacity 2 and each course has capacity 1. The prerequisites of both
applicants are the same, and are as follows:
c1 → c3; c2 → c4.
The applicants have the following preference lists:
P (a1) : c1, c2, c4, c3
P (a2) : c2, c1, c3, c4
The sequential allocation mechanism with policy σ = a1, a2, a1, a2 will assign to applicant
a1 the bundle {c1, c4} and to applicant a2 the bundle {c2, c3}. Clearly, neither of the assigned
bundles fulfils the prerequisites.
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Now suppose that in the sequential allocation mechanism an applicant is allowed to
choose the most-preferred undersubscribed course for which she already has all the prereq-
uisites. Let the policy start with a1, a2. Applicant a1 can choose neither c1 nor c2, as these
courses require a prerequisite that she is not assigned yet. So she chooses c4. Similarly,
applicant a2 will choose c3. When these applicants are allowed to pick their next course,
irrespective of the remainder of the policy, a1 must choose c2 and a2 must choose c1. So in
the resulting matching M we have M(a1) = {c2, c4} and M(a2) = {c1, c3}. This matching
is clearly not Pareto optimal, since both applicants will strictly improve by exchanging their
assignments.
Example 15. Consider a cacr instance in which A = {a1, a2, . . . , an} is the set of appli-
cants and C = {c1, c2, . . . , c2n} is the set of courses, for some n ≥ 1. Assume that each
course has capacity 1, whilst each applicant has capacity n and ranks all courses in increasing
indicial order. Also suppose that the prerequisites for each applicant are as follows:
c1 → c2 → · · · → c2n.
There are n POMs: in the POM Mi (1 ≤ i ≤ n), ai is assigned the set of courses
{cn+1, cn+2, . . . , c2n} and no course is assigned to any other applicant. Given any policy, let
ai be the first applicant considered during an execution of SM-CAPR. When Explore is called
on c1, 2n courses are checked, then Explore is called on c2 leading to 2n − 1 courses being
checked, and so on. This continues until Explore is called on cn+1, leading to the matching
Mi being constructed at this point. Note that even if the entire recursive process were to
halt as soon as |S| > q(ai), the total number of courses checked at this step of SM-CAPR
is still Ω(n2). Similarly, the number of courses checked at each other applicant’s turn in
the policy is also Ω(n2); the only difference is that in each such case SM-CAPR determines
that cn+i is full immediately, for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n). The overall number of steps used by
SM-CAPR is then Ω(n3) = Ω(Ln2).
Example 16. SM-CAPR is not able to produce all POMs, even in the case when there are
only two applicants a1, a2 and the capacity of each course is 1. We provide two instances to
illustrate this. In I1 the prerequisites of all applicants are the same. In I2 they are different,
but each course has at most one prerequisite.
In I1, we have C = {c1, c2, c3}, and course c1 has two prerequisites as follows:
c1 → c2; c1 → c3. (1)
Each applicant has capacity 3 and the following preference list: c1, c2, c3.
Depending on the policy, SM-CAPR outputs either the matching that assigns all three
courses to a1, or the matching that assigns all three courses to a2. However, it is easy to
see that the two matchings that assign c2 to one applicant and c3 to the other one are also
Pareto optimal.
In I2, we have C = {c1, c2, c3}. Now the prerequisites of the applicants are different:
c1 →a1 c3; c2 →a2 c3, (2)
Each applicant has capacity 2 and their preferences are as follows:
P (a1) : c1, c2, c3 P (a2) : c2, c1, c3.
There are 3 different POMs, as follows:
M1(a1) = {c1, c3}, M1(a2) = ∅;
M2(a1) = ∅, M2(a2) = {c2, c3};
M3(a1) = {c2}, M3(a2) = {c1, c3}.
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SM-CAPR outputs M1 with policy σ = a1, a2 and M2 with policy σ = a2, a1. Notice
that M3 cannot be obtained by SM-CAPR.
Example 17. Let I be an instance of capr in which there are two applicants, a1, a2, each
of which has capacity 2, and four courses, c1, c2, c3, c4, each of which has capacity 1. The
prerequisites of both applicants are the same, and are as follows:
c1 → c2; c3 → c4.
The utilities of the courses for the applicants are as follows:
ua1(c1) = ua2(c3) = 6
ua1(c3) = ua2(c1) = 4
ua1(c4) = ua2(c2) = 3
ua1(c2) = ua2(c4) = 0
Regardless of the policy, SM-CAPR constructs the matching M = {(a1, c1), (a1, c2), (a2, c3),
(a2, c4)}. M is not a POM as it is dominated by M ′ = {(a1, c3), (a1, c4), (a2, c1), (a2, c2)}.
Example 18. Consider a capr instance I in which A = {a1, a2} and C = {c1, c2, . . . , cn}
for some n ≥ 1. Let the preferences of the applicants be
P (a1) : c1, c2, . . . , cn P (a2) : cn
and let ci → ci+1 for each applicant (1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1). Assume that a1 has capacity n, whilst
the capacity of a2 and the capacity of every course is 1.
There are two POMs in I: if SM-CAPR is executed relative to the policy a1, a2 then we
obtain the POM M1 that assigns all the n courses to a1 and nothing to a2; if instead the
policy is reversed, we obtain the POM M2 that assigns nothing to a1 and the single course
cn to a2. Hence executing SM-CAPR relative to different policies can give rise to POMs
with arbitrarily large difference in cardinality. It follows that SM-CAPR is not in general
a constant-factor approximation algorithm for max pom capr. However, notice that in
this example the cardinality of the downset of each course is not bounded by a constant;
enforcing such a condition could improve the approximation possibilities.
Example 19. The SM-CACR mechanism can be extended without difficulty to the variant
of cacr (considered in this example only) in which corequisites can be applicant-specific.
However it is no longer true that the mechanism is capable of reaching all POMs relative
to a suitable policy, as we now illustrate. Consider a cacr instance with two applicants
and three courses. Suppose that each applicant has capacity 2, and that each course has
capacity 1. Assume that the applicants have the following preference lists:
P (a1) : c1, c2, c3
P (a2) : c2, c1, c3
Assume that each applicant has as corequisites the first and last courses on her list. Then
SM-CACR will return the matching {(ai, ci), (ai, c3)} if the first applicant in the policy is
ai (i ∈ {1, 2}). However the matching M = {(a1, c2), (a2, c1)} is also Pareto optimal and
cannot be obtained by SM-CACR.
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